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Leffel: State v. Jenks

STATE V. JENKS FAILS TO CLARIFY
APPELLATE STANDARDS OF EVIDENCE REVIEW IN OHIO

INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court of Ohio recently overruled a longstanding jury
instruction regarding circumstantial evidence.' The instruction was referred to as
the circumstantial evidence charge and was based on the circumstantial evidence
rule:

In the absence of direct evidence, circumstantial evidence, by itself,
will justify a finding of guilty if the circumstances are (entirely)
consistent with the defendant's guilt, and are wholly inconsistent or
irreconcilable with any reasonable theory of the defendant's innocence,
and are so convincing as to exclude a reasonable doubt of the
2
defendant's guilt.
The court also changed the standard of appellate review in cases where
circumstantial evidence was exclusively relied upon to prove an essential element
of a crime. 3 The former standard of review was based on the circumstantial
evidence rule and was used by reviewing courts to determine whether a jury
verdict was supported by the manifest weight of the evidence or whether the
evidence was sufficient to support the conviction:
An appellate court will reverse a conviction based solely on
circumstantial evidence where that evidence does not, as a matter of
law, preclude all reasonable theories of innocence... once the jury has
reached its decision, an appellate court, in a case where circumstantial
evidence is relied upon, will reverse only where the evidence is
insufficient as a matter of law to enable the jury to exclude a
4
reasonable hypothesis of innocence.
This standard of review originated in State v. Kulig 5 and was explicitly overruled
6
by State v. Jenks.
The analysis that follows focuses on two points. First, many reviewing
courts in Ohio have failed to discern between reversing a conviction because it was
1 State v. Jenks, 574 N.E.2d 492, 502 (Ohio 1991).
2 Ohio Jury Instructions 405.03.
3 Jenks, 574 N.E.2d at 503.
41d at 497.
5 309 N.E.2d 897, 899 (Ohio 1974), overruled by State v. Jenks, 574 N.E.2d 492 (Ohio 1991).
6 Jenks, 574 N.E.2d at 503.
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against the manifest weight of the evidence and reversing because the evidence was
not sufficient to support the conviction. The concepts and associated standards of
review are separate and distinct. Jenks failed to clarify the distinction and may
actually add to the confusion. Second, the elimination of the circumstantial
evidence rule has implications concerning the definition of reasonable doubt in
Ohio.
BACKGROUND

The CircumstantialEvidence Standardof Review
The circumstantial evidence standard of review originated in State v. Kulig,
a Supreme Court of Ohio decision.7 In Kulig, an executor was charged and
convicted of embezzlement. 8 The executor reported to the police that a radio and
television were stolen from the decedent's house. 9 Upon investigation, the police
found a radio and television inexplicably in the executor's possession. 0 The
executor claimed he was cleaning and testing the appliances in order to determine
their value for resale. IlAt trial, the court failed to give instructions concerning the
duties of an executor. 12 The executor was subsequently convicted of
13
embezzlement.
On appeal, the court began its opinion by stating that its function was not
to weigh evidence developed at trial, but noted that it could do so "in order to
determine whether that evidence is of sufficient probative force to support a finding
of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." 14 The court then noted the circumstantial
evidence standard, reviewed the evidence of the case, and reversed the conviction. 5
The court held that the executor's possession of the appliances could be explained
16
by a reasonable theory of innocence as well as a theory of guilt.
The dissent observed that the jury may have arrived at a different
conclusion had they been properly instructed on the duties of an executor. 17 The
dissent disagreed with the majority on the standard of review and maintained that
the earlier cases stood for the proposition that "[the court] will examine the record
of a criminal trial to determine whether evidence was presented, 'which, if believed,
7Id at 496.
8 Kulig, 309 N.E.2d at 897.
9Id
10 Id. at 897-98.

SId. at 898.
12 Id
13 id

14 ,dat 898.
15
Id at898-99.
16 at 899.
171Id
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would convince the average mind of the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt."' 18 The dissent noted that weighing the evidence was not the Court's
function when reviewing evidence in a criminal case. 19 "Weighing evidence is not
synonymous with determining its legal sufficiency." DIn other words, the dissent
thought that the majority was making a determination of whether the verdict was
supported by sufficient evidence and should not have engaged in any weighing of
the evidence.
In subsequent decisions, the Ohio Supreme Court failed to distinguish
between reviewing whether a verdict was against the manifest weight of the
evidence and whether a verdict was supported by sufficient evidence. In State v.
Graven,21 the court affirmed a theft by deception conviction under R.C. 2913.02.22
The appellant claimed that the trial court erred in not granting a motion of acquittal
and that the verdict was against the manifest weight of the evidence. 23 The court
interpreted this as a claim that the evidence was not sufficient to support the
conviction.31 The court stated that it would review the record and determine
whether the evidence, if believed, would convince an average person that the
defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. The court also reiterated the
circumstantial evidence standard of review and held that a conviction will be
reversed "only where the evidence is insufficient as a matter of law to enable the
jury to exclude a reasonable hypothesis of innocence. "26
In State v. Davis, 27 the appellant questioned the credibility of the
prosecution's witnesses. 28 The case did not involve an application of Kulig. The
Ohio Supreme Court interpreted this as a claim that the verdict was against the
manifest weight of the evidence. 29 "The standard for our review is whether, after
viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, a reasonable jury
could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." 30
Lower reviewing courts that have applied Kulig have also confused the
concepts of determining whether a verdict is against the manifest weight of the
evidence and whether the verdict is supported by sufficient evidence. In State v.
18 Id

19 Id
20Id
21 374 N.E.2d 1370 (Ohio 1978).
22Id at 1374.
23Id at 1372.
24
1d
25
1d
26
Id at 1373.
27 528 N.E.2d 925 (Ohio 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1034 (1989).
28
1d at 930.
29
1d
30
1d
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Walker, 31 the appellant's second assignment of error was that the verdict was not
supported by the manifest weight of the evidence. 2 The Court of Appeals for
Cuyahoga County interpreted this as a claim that the evidence was insufficient to
support the conviction and felt it was obliged to view the evidence as if it was
believed.3 The court also cited Kulig for the proposition that the "examination
involves the weighing of the evidence developed at trial."M
In State v. Dickerson, 35 the defendant claimed the verdict was against the
weight of the evidence. " The Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County stated that
the only possible basis for this assertion was that some of the evidence was
circumstantial. 37 The court did not review the weight of the evidence but found that
there was no reasonable theory of innocence under Kulig. 31
4°
In State v. Williams, 39 the defendant was convicted of murdering a child.
The defendant, Williams, claimed that the verdict was not supported by sufficient
evidence and that it was against the manifest weight of the evidence. 41 The victim
was a three year old child that died "from compression of the brain caused by a
subdural hematoma which in turn was caused by a broadly placed zone of bruising
or trauma consistent with banging ones head against a sink or tub." 42 Williams
claimed that the child accidently fell and hit its head on a sink. 4 There was no
direct evidence that Williams "purposely caused the death of another."'' 4 If the jury
found that Williams struck the child, the jury could also find that he purposely
killed the child because a person is presumed to intend the natural and probable
45
consequences of his actions.

At the conclusion of reviewing the evidence, the court stated "without
regard to the weight or credibility to be given to such evidence, a reasonable
hypothesis of defendant's guilt would exist, as reasonable as would be the
hypothesis of his innocence." 46 In order to reach this conclusion, the court must
have viewed each side's evidence as true in determining whether the respective
31 498 N.E.2d 191 (Ohio Ct. App. 1985), cert.denied, 480 U.S. 916 (1987).
321d at 193.
33 Id. at 193-94.
34 d at 194.
35 367 N.E.2d 927 (Ohio Ct. App. 1977).
36 Id at 930.

371,d
38

ld
39 354 N.E.2d 691 (Ohio Ct. App. 1976).
40 l at 693.
41 Id

42/id

431Id at 693-94.
44Id at 694.
45Id
461ad at 695.
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theories of innocence and guilt were reasonable. The court then confronted the
Kulig rule which would have required the court to acquit the defendant. 4, However,
the court seemed reluctant to overrule the jury's verdict and engaged in a difficult
analysis that concluded with the following statement:
Accordingly, we also conclude in application to the instant case that
since there was substantial evidence of probative value which, if
believed, would support a determination of both a reasonable
hypothesis of guilt and a reasonable hypothesis of innocence we
cannot substitute our judgment for that of the jury when in
consideration of all the evidence in the case and applying their own
determination of weight and credibility they arrived at a verdict of
guilty.,,
This holding does not distinguish between reviewing whether evidence is sufficient
to support a verdict and reviewing whether a verdict is against the manifest weight
of the evidence.
The CircumstantialEvidence Rule and its Relation to the Definition of Reasonable
Doubt in Ohio
The origin of the circumstantial evidence charge in Ohio dates back at least
as far as the 1861 Ohio Supreme Court case of Fullerv. State.49 The issue in that
case was whether the defendant was entitled to a jury instruction that the
prosecution must prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 0 The trial court had
refused the requested charge and instructed the jury that the defendant could be
found guilty by a preponderance of the evidence. 51 The defendant subsequently
52
was convicted.
The court began its analysis by stating that a defendant was entitled to a
presumption of innocence, and the burden of proof was on the prosecutor unless
expressly provided otherwise by statute. 5 The presumption of innocence could
only be overcome by "full proof' of guilt.M Full proof required that the evidence
entirely exclude every reasonable doubt.55 The court continued with its analysis to
address circumstantial evidence in criminal cases:
47

1a5
48Id at 696.
49 12 Ohio St. 433 (1861).
50
Id.at 433-34.
51

ld at 434.

52 i
531d at 434.
54 I at 434-35.

55 "Evidence which satisfies the minds of the jury of the truth of the fact in dispute, to the entire exclusion
of every reasonable doubt, constitutes full proof of the fact; absolute mathematical or metaphysical
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In criminal prosecutions, it has been observed, the circumstantial
evidence should be such as to produce nearly the same degree of
certainty, as that which arises from direct testimony, and to exclude a
rational probability of innocence. Doubtless, the circumstances ought
to be of such a nature as not to be reasonably accounted for, on the
supposition of the prisoner's innocence, but perfectly reconcilable with
56
the supposition of his guilt.

The court concluded by stating the proposition that proof beyond a reasonable
doubt was required in all criminal cases because innocent defendants should not be
subjected to criminal punishment. 57
Language reminiscent of the Fuller opinion appeared in jury instructions
for criminal cases for a number of years. - The concept that a reasonable doubt
existed "if the material facts without which guilt cannot be established may be
fairly reconciled with innocence" remained a part of the definition of reasonable
doubt even if the conviction partly rested on direct evidence. certainty is not essential, and in the course of judicial investigations would be unattainable. Even the most
direct evidence can produce nothing more than such a high degree of probability, as amounts to a moral
certainty. From the highest degree, it may decline, by an infinite number of gradations, until it produces in
the mind nothing more than a mere preponderance of assent, in favor of the particular fact. The distinction
between full proof and mere preponderance of evidence is, in its application, very important. In all
criminal cases whatsoever, it is essential to a verdict of condemnation, that the guilt of the accused should
be fully proved; neither a mere preponderance of evidence, nor any weight of preponderant evidence is
sufficient for the purpose, unless it generate full belief of the fact to the exclusion of all reasonable doubt"
Id at 435.
56 Id
57 "However important it may be to secure the conviction of the guilty, yet a humane and just policy
regards the acquittal of the innocent as still more desirable. If the rule is to be applied in cases only
involving a certain grade of crime, where shall the line be drawn? And upon what principle shall the
distinction be justified? If convictions be permitted upon a bare preponderance of proof, then, according to
the doctrine of probabilities, we might expect to find a bare majority of such convictions, to be cases of
actual guilt. The protection of the innocent demands more than this."
Id. at436-37.
58 "I have already stated that the presumption of the defendant's innocence is not overcome by a mere
preponderance of the evidence, but that such presumption of this innocence stands until overthrown by
evidence of such force that it satisfies your minds of defendant's guilt beyond all reasonable doubt This
does not mean that you must be satisfied beyond all doubt, but beyond all reasonable doubt. The law is too
humane to demand a conviction while a reasonable doubt remains in the minds of the jury. You will be
justified and required to considera reasonabledoubt as existing ifthe materialfacts without which guilt cannot
be established may be fairly reconciled with innocence [emphasis added]. In human affairs absolute certainty
is not always attainable. From the nature of things reasonable certainty is all that can be attained on many
subjects. When a full and candid consideration of the evidence produces a conviction of guilt, and satisfies
the mind beyond a reasonable doubt, a mere captious ingenious artificial doubt is of no avail. If your are not
fully satisfied, but find only that there are strong probabilities of guilt, or strong, suspicious circumstances,
your only safe course is to acquit."
State v. Morris, 5 Ohio N.P. 232, 233-34 (C.P. 1898). A similar charge is presented in State v. Cass, 5
Ohio N.P. 381, 382 (C.P. 1898) and State v. Bennet, 5 Ohio N.P. 284, 285 (C.P. 1898).
59 5 Ohio N.P. 232 (C.P. 1898). In State v. Morris, the corpus delicti was in issue. Proof of the corpus delicti
involved showing that the victim had died by criminal agency and that the defendant was responsible. Id. at
235. The state introduced alleged confessions of the defendant which constituted direct evidence. Id
Circumstantial evidence was relied upon to prove criminal agency because the victim was badly burned in
a fire and the exact cause of death probably couldn't be determined. Id. Another issue in the trial was
whether Morris had sufficient mental capacity when he made the alleged confessions. Id. ffthe jury found
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By 1898, a form of the circumstantial evidence charge existed and was
used if proof of an element was supported solely by circumstantial evidence. 6° At
this time, the concept that a reasonable doubt existed "if the material facts without
which guilt cannot be established may be fairly reconciled with innocence" was
still a part of a commonly used definition of reasonable doubt. 6 These two
concepts are somewhat coextensive and conceptually equivalent. The
circumstantial evidence charge emphasized the necessity that the defendant's guilt
be proved to the exclusion of any reasonable theory of innocence.
By 1902, the definition of reasonable doubt began to change.61 The older
definition of reasonable doubt and the concept of full proof still appeared. i In

that the defendant had the requisite mental capacity, the confessions could be used as direct evidence of
other elements such as premeditation and intent. Id
60 State v. Bennett, 5 Ohio N.P. 284, 285 (C.P. 1898).
The proof of a charge made in a criminal case involves two distinct propositions: First,
that the act charged was done. Second, that it was done by the person charged. In order to
convict, both these propositions must be established by evidence beyond a reasonable
doubt. Either of them may be proven by direct testimony, or by circumstantial evidence.
Direct testimony is the positive statement, under oath, of a fact, by a credible eye-witness.
Circumstantial evidence is the positive proof of circumstances which necessarily or
usually attend such facts. In order to convict, in a criminal case, upon circumstantial
evidence, each of the several circumstances relied upon to prove any essential element of the
crime must be given by direct testimony beyond a reasonable doubt: each, when all are taken
together, must be consistent with all the others, and not inconsistent with any other
established fact, and all taken together must point surely and unerringly to the guilt of the
defendant, and must be inconsistent with any other rational supposition titan that the
defendant is guilty of the offense charged
Id
61 State v. Bennett, 5 Ohio N.P. 284 (C.P. 1898).
What is a reasonable doubt? A verdict of guilty can never be returned without convincing
evidence. The law is too humane to demand a conviction while rational doubt remains in
the minds of a jury. You will be justified, and are required to consider a reasonable doubt as
existing, if the material facts, without which guilt can not be established may fairly be
reconciled with innocence [emphasis added]. In human affairs absolute certainty is not
always attainable. From the nature of things reasonable certainty is all that can be attained
on many subjects. When a full and candid consideration of the evidence produces a
conviction of guilt, and satisfies the mind to a reasonable certainty, a mere captious or
ingenious artificial doubt is of no avail. You will look, then to all the evidence, and if that
satisfies you of the defendant's guilt, you must say so. If you are not fully satisfied, but find
only that there are strong probabilities of guilt, your only safe course is to acquit.
Id at 285.
62
1 now charge you what is meant by the expression reasonable doubt. By the expression
reasonable doubt is meant in law actual, substantial doubt. A reasonable doubt exists in
that state of the case which after a comparison and consideration of all the evidence in the
case, evidence introduced by the state together with that introduced by the defendant,
leaves the minds of the jurors or any of them in that condition that they cannot say they
feel an abiding conviction of the guilt of the defendant, and are satisfied to a moral
certainty of the truth of the charge. The proof is to be deemed to be beyond a reasonable
doubt when the evidence is sufficient to impress the judgment of ordinarily prudent men with
a conviction on which they would act without hesitation in their own most important affairs of
life.
State v. Strong, 12 Ohio Dec. 701, 705 (C.P. 1902) (emphasis added). See also State v. Lingafelter, 52
Ohio L. Bull. 88 (C.P. 1906), aftd 83 N.E. 897 (Ohio 1908).
63 State v. Oppenheimer, 49 Ohio L. Bull. 257, 259 (C.P. 1904).
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1905 the United States Supreme Court decided Holt v. United States.64 The Court
approved a definition of reasonable doubt, a variation of which eventually became
widely accepted in federal courts. 65 By this time this definition had already
appeared in Ohio decisions. 66
At some point, the circumstantial evidence charge was restricted to cases
where circumstantial evidence was relied on exclusively to prove an essential
element of a crime. 67 It would not be given if the state produced some direct
evidence on each element of the crime. 6 The 1915 case of Carterv. State appears
to be the case that established this restriction. d Carter involved an indictment for
arson, and the evidence was entirely circumstantial. 70 "To convict in a criminal case
upon circumstantial evidence, each of the several circumstances relied upon and
necessary to prove any essential element of the crime must be established by the
evidence beyond reasonable doubt. Each link essential to the chain must be thus
proven." 71
The language of the opinion does not make clear exactly how this decision
restricted the circumstantial evidence rule to cases where evidence of an element
was wholly circumstantial. 72 In Carter, all the evidence was circumstantial, and the
language "relied upon and necessary to prove any essential element" 73 does not
necessarily restrict the circumstantial evidence rule to situations of exclusive
reliance upon circumstantial evidence to prove an essential element of a crime.
64 218 U.S. 245 (1905). "A reasonable doubt is an actual doubt that you are conscious of after going over in
your minds the entire case, giving consideration to all the testimony and every part of it. If you then feel
uncertain and not fully convinced that the defendant is guilty, and believe that you are acting in a
reasonable manner, and if you believe that a reasonable man in any matter of like importance would
hesitate to act because of such a doubt as you are conscious of having, that is a reasonable doubt, of which
the defendant is entitled to have the benefit." id. at 254.
65 "The most acceptable form of an instruction is that a reasonable doubt is a doubt that would cause
prudent men to hesitate before acting in matters of importance to themselves ......
CHARLES A. WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACnCE ANDPROCEDURE § 500 (2d ed. 1982).
66 State v. Oppenheimer, 49 Ohio Law Bull. 257 (C.P. 1904).
It means an honest doubt as you would be willing to act upon in the more weighty and
important matters relating to your own affairs, or such a just and honest doubt after a fair
comparison and consideration of all the evidence so that you cannot honestly say that you
are satisfied of the defendant's guilt.
Id. at 259.
67 State v. Sheppard, 128 N.E.2d 471, 503 (Ohio Ct. App. 1955); State v. Kulig, 309 N.E.2d 897, 899 (Ohio
1974), overruled by State v. Jenks, 574 N.E.2d 492 (Ohio 1991).
68
Sheppard, 128 N.E.2d at 503; Kulig, 309 N.E.2d at 899.
69 4 Ohio App. 193 (1915). Based on the cases researched, Carter appears to be the oldest case that
clearly establishes this proposition. Kulig, 309 N.E.2d at 899; Sheppard, 128 N.E.2d at 503; State v. Sorgee,
377 N.E.2d 782, 783 (1978).
70 Carer,4 Ohio App. at 194.
71 d at 196.
72 "From the authorities cited in the brief of counsel for plaintiff in error and others the rule appears to be
well established that it is the duty of the trial court to charge the jury that the particular facts and
circumstances relied upon to establish guilt must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt; also, that when
taken together they must be so convincing as to be irreconcilable with the innocence of the accused, or, as
said by some authorities, as to admit of no other hypothesis than the guilt of the accused. "Id
73 Id
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In 1929, the Ohio General Assembly enacted General Code Section
13442-3. 74 This enactment created a rift between the circumstantial evidence rule
and the definition of reasonable doubt because it statutorily eliminated the older
definition that "a reasonable doubt... exist[s] if the material facts without which
guilt cannot be established may be fairly reconciled with innocence." 1 In spite of
the enactment, courts were still permitted to add to the definition of reasonable
doubt as long as the statutory definition was read to the jury. 76 However, the Ohio
Supreme Court has more recently ruled that such additions must not prejudice
either party, and a court must use "extreme care" in expanding the statutory
definition.77
In 1954 the United States Supreme Court decided Holland v. United
In that decision, the Court discarded the use of the circumstantial evidence
rule in federal cases. 79 The Court also addressed the definition of reasonable doubt
used by the trial court.80 In so doing the Court reaffirmed a definition of reasonable
doubt as the kind of doubt a juror would hesitate to act upon in the more serious
and important affairs of the juror's life. 8 In 1972 the Ohio General Assembly
enacted the Revised Code Section 2901.05, which effectively enacted the standard
of reasonable doubt approved for federal courts in Holland.W This is the same
standard which is in effect today. In spite of the enactment of a standard
compatible with federal courts, Ohio maintained the circumstantial evidence rule.
Ohio courts continued to apply the circumstantial evidence charge without
complaint.
States.78

74 "A defendant in a criminal action is presumed to be innocent until he is proved guilty of the crime
charged, and in case of a reasonable doubt whether his guilt is satisfactorily shown, he shall be acquitted.
But the effect of this presumption of innocence is only to place upon the state the burden of proving him
guilty beyond reasonable doubt. Reasonable doubt is defined as follows: 'It is not mere possible doubt,
because everything relating to human affairs or depending upon moral evidence is open to some possible or
imaginary doubt. It is that state of the case which, after the entire comparison and consideration of all the
evidence, leaves the minds of the jurors in the condition that they cannot say they feel an abiding
conviction to a moral certainty of the truth of the charge.' In charging a jury the court shall state the
meaning of presumption of innocence, and read the foregoing definition of reasonable doubt." Act of April
1, 1929, amended Senate Bill No. 8, ch. 21, 1929 Ohio Laws 113 (renumbered as 2945.04 as enacted 1953,
and repealed 1973).
75 State v. Morris, 5 Ohio N.P. at 233-34.
76 McGoon v. State, 177 N.E. 238, 239 (Ohio Ct. App. 1931), overruled by, State v. Sargent, 322 N.E.2d 634
(Ohio 1975).
77
Sargent, 322 N.E.2d at 638.
78 348 U.S. 121 (1954).
79 Id. at 139-40.
80 Il at 140.
81 Id.
82 "Reasonable doubt is present when the jurors, after they have carefully considered and compared all the
evidence, cannot say they are firmly convinced of the truth of the charge. It is a doubt based on reason and
common sense. Reasonable doubt is not mere possible doubt because everything relating to human affairs
or depending on moral evidence is open to some possible or imaginary doubt. Proof beyond a reasonable
doubt is proof of such characterthat an ordinaryperson would be willing to rely and act upon it in the most
important of his own affairs. "Act of December 14, 1972, amended Substitute House Bill No. 511, 1971-1972
Ohio Laws 134 (amended effective 1978, the amendment did not effect section (D) (emphasis added).
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Facts
On June 29, 1987 Robert Risberg left a Cleveland Indians baseball game
and was walking along a sidewalk. 3 He stepped on a plate set flush with the
sidewalk next to a passenger shelter of the Greater Cleveland Regional Transit
Authority (RTA). 84 Apparently, the plate was energized by a short to an electrical
transformer that was used to light advertising panels at the shelter. 85 Risberg was
electrocuted and died. 6
The incident received wide media coverage. 3 RTA was notified that
Risberg's daughter had retained legal counsel. 88 On July 7, 1987, the RTA Board
of Trustees initiated a formal investigation. 89
Appellees Mary Jenks and Dale Madison both worked in the planning
department of RTA. 90 Jenks was head of the department. 91 Madison was a
transportation planner and Jenks' subordinate. 9- On July 7, 1987, Madison gave a
list of documents to a group of summer interns with instructions to find the
documents alj throw them away." One of the interns testified that at least one
94
large document addressed electrical work and bus shelters.
Another RTA employee, Rose Moviel, testified that on July 15, Madison
requested that she retrieve any documents concerning energy or shelters from the
RTA archives. 95 Three boxes of documents were delivered to Madison's office on
July 16.96 On July 17, Madison asked her to remove any documents relating to
energy or shelters from the boxes. 9 The boxes were half empty, and there were no
documents relating to energy or shelters .98

83 State v. Jenks, 574 N.E.2d 492, 494 (Ohio 1991).
841Id
85 Id
86 Id
871 d
88 d

89/,d
91d
92

/,d
93 Id at 504.
94/,d
95

1d at 505.
96 Id
97

1d
98/,4
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Donald Yuratovac, a seventeen year employee of RTA, directed Steve
Polzin to conduct a survey of the shelters in 1983.9) Polzin produced many
documents and memoranda in which he identified some problems with electrical
wiring at some of the shelters. 100 On July 6, Yuratovic asked Moviel if she had
retrieved the Polzin files. 'l There were two boxes near her desk. 102 The next day
he returned but couldn't find the boxes of files. 103 The trash dumpsters were filled
with documents thrown away by the interns. 104 Yuratovic testified that he never
again saw the Polzin files. 105
Procedure
On October 28, 1987, appellees were each indicted on two counts of
tampering with evidence in violation of R.C. 2921.12.106 The indictments alleged
that Jenks and Madison destroyed documents "for the purpose of impairing the
value or availability of said documents, with the knowledge that an official
investigation was in progress." 10 7 The jury found Jenks and Madison guilty on
both counts.'°0
Jenks and Madison appealed, asserting that their convictions were not
supported by sufficient evidence and that the verdicts were against the manifest
weight of the evidence.' °9 In addition, Jenks also asserted that the trial court erred
in not granting her Criminal Rule 29 motion for acquittal. n0 The appellate court
consolidated the appeals and reversed the convictions."' The prosecution
Court
subsequently appealed to the Supreme Court of Ohio. 112 The Supreme
3
convictions."
the
reinstated
and
decision
court
appellate
the
reversed
The Ohio Court ofAppeals Analysis
14
The court of appeals reversed the convictions based on two grounds.
First, the court observed that all of the evidence concerning intent was

99Id
101,d
101 Id at 506.

102 Id
10314d
1041d/
105/ad
106 ld at 494.

107Id
108 Id at 495.
1091d
110Id

11 Id
112id
113/Id

114 id/
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circumstantial.1 5 The court then applied the Kulig standard of review and found the
prosecution's evidence failed to eliminate the defendants' equally plausible theory
of innocence.1 1 6 Second, the court held that evidence concerning the condition of
Risberg's body was irrelevant and prejudicial and that references to "corruption" at
RTA by the prosecutor during the opening statement amounted to prejudicial
prosecutorial misconduct. 117
The Ohio Supreme Court Analysis
The Ohio Supreme Court addressed three issues. First, whether the
circumstantial evidence rule and the Kulig standard of appellate review should be
eliminated.118 Second, whether the prosecutor's statements concerning "corruption"
at RTA were reversible error. "19 Finally, the court examined whether the trial court
committed reversible error by admitting evidence concerning the condition of
Risberg's body. 120
In its analysis, the court seemed to be frustrated with what appeared to be
two standards of reasonable doubt.' 2' The court clearly viewed the circumstantial
evidence charge as being a higher standard than proof beyond a reasonable
doubt. 22 The court. reviewed several federal and state decisions. 123 The court
appears to have based its decision to eliminate the circumstantial evidence charge
on two premises. First, circumstantial evidence has the same probative force as
direct evidence.' 24 Second, only one standard of reasonable doubt should be
applied in criminal cases.125 The court noted that the charge was unnecessary

116 I
118 d a1496.

119 I
1201d

121 "inevery criminal case, the jury is asked to weigh all of the admissible evidence, both circumstantial
and direct, to determine if the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Hence, there is but one
standard of proof in a criminal case, and that is proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. This tenet of the
criminal law remains true, whether the evidence against a defendant is circumstantial or direct. We
therefore hold that where the state relies on circumstantial evidence to prove an element of the offense, and
where the jury is properly instructed on the standards for reasonable doubt, an additional instruction on
circumstantial evidence is not required." Id. at 503.
122 "We agree with those courts that have held that an additional instruction on the sufficiency of
circumstantial evidence invites confusion and is unwarranted. Since circumstantial evidence and direct
evidence are indistinguishable so far as the jury's fact-finding function is concerned, all that is required of
the jury is that it weigh all of the evidence, direct and circumstantial, against the standard of proof beyond
a reasonable doubt. Nothing more should be required of a factfinder." Id at 502.
123 Id at498-502.
124 Id at 502.
125 Id at 502-03.
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regardless of whether it introduced a higher standard of proof into jury
126
deliberations.
The court was particularly influenced by Holland v. United States. 127 In
Holland the defendants were convicted of tax evasion based on the net worth
burden of proof. 128 This method of proof is highly circumstantial. 129 Among
several assignments of error, the defendants claimed that the trial court erred by
refusing to give the circumstantial evidence charge. 130 The Court noted that some
federal courts had granted the instruction but held "the better rule is that where the
jury is properly instructed on the standards for reasonable doubt, such an additional
instruction on circumstantial evidence is confusing and incorrect." 131The Court
went on to hold that circumstantial evidence and direct evidence are equivalent and
that, on occasion, either can point to an incorrect result. 132
In Jenks, the court expressed dissatisfaction with the circumstantial
evidence standard of review because it forced the court to engage in a two step
analysis. 133 A reviewing court was required to determine whether there was
sufficient direct evidence to support the conviction beyond a reasonable doubt and
then repeat the process to determine whether the circumstantial evidence was
126 "If one accepts the theory that the circumstantial evidence rule imposes a higher burden on the
prosecution, then that added burden is erroneous. The standard of proof in a criminal trial is guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt, and no more. If one accepts the postulation that the circumstantial evidence rule is an
alternative means for assessing whether the reasonable doubt standard has been met, then the additional
jury instruction is redundant, and can only serve to confuse the jury." Id.
at 503 n.5.
127 348 U.S. 121, 124 (1954).
128 "In a typical net worth prosecution, the Government, having concluded that the taxpayer's records are
inadequate as a basis for determining income tax liability, attempts to establish an 'opening net worth' or
total net value of the taxpayer's assets at the beginning of a given year. It then proves increases in the
taxpayer's net worth for each succeeding year during the period under examination and calculates the
difference between the adjusted net values of the taxpayer's assets at the beginning and the end of each of
the years involved. The taxpayer's nondeductible expenditures, including living expenses, are added to
these increases, and if the resulting figure for any year is substantially greater than the taxable income
reported by the taxpayer for that year, the Government claims the excess represents unreported taxable
income." Id. at 125.
129 Id at 124.
130 1& at 139.
131 Id at 139-40.
132 "In both instances, a jury is asked to weigh the chances that the evidence correctly points to guilt
against the possibility of inaccuracy or ambiguous inference. In both, the jury must use its experience with
people and events in weighing the probabilities. If the jury is convinced beyond a reasonable doubt, we can
require no more." lIdat 140.
133 State v. Jenks, 574 N.E.2d 492, 497 (Ohio 1991). The Kulig standard entails a two-step process. First, as
is done in a case involving direct evidence of guilt, an appellate court must determine whether there is
sufficient probative evidence to support the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The second step,
employed only when the state relies entirely on circumstantial evidence to prove an essential element of
the offense, requires an appellate court to re-examine the circumstantial evidence to determine if the
defendant's theory of innocence is reasonable or plausible. In other words, the appellate court must weigh
two competing theories, one pointing to guilt and the other to innocence. In order for the conviction to
stand, the appellate court must be satisfied not only that the circumstantial evidence supports a finding of
defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, but, in addition, that the circumstantial evidence is of
sufficient force as to exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence put forward by the defense. Id

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1993

13

Akron Law Review, Vol. 26 [1993], Iss. 1, Art. 6

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[ Vol. 26:1

sufficient to exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence. 134 A reviewing
court was then required to weigh the two competing theories of guilt and
innocence.1 35 The new standard eliminates the two step analysis and is stated as
follows:
In other words, an appellate court's function when reviewing the
sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction is to
examine the evidence admitted at trial to determine whether such
evidence, if believed, would convince the average mind of the
defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt .... The verdict will not
be disturbed unless the appellate court finds that reasonable minds
36
could not reach the conclusion reached by the trier of facts.
On the second issue, the court held that the prosecutor's statements
concerning corruption at RTA did not create "a miscarriage of justice." 137 On the
third issue, the court held that testimony of Risberg's daughter was relevant in
determining whether the defendants had notice of the impending civil action. 3 8 The
court found testimony of the coroner concerning the condition of the body was
irrelevant and inflammatory, but did not rise to the level of plain error. 39 Any other
improperly admitted evidence was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.'14
ANALYSIS
Manifest Weight of the Evidence and Sufficiency of the Evidence are Separate and
Distinct Theories of Review
In Jenks, both defendants asserted "that the jury's verdict was against the
manifest weight of the evidence, and that the state's evidence was insufficient as a
matter of law on the essential element of intent." 41 This assignment of error forced
the court of appeals to review and weigh the evidence based on the Kulig standard.
Jenks also claimed that the trial court had committed error by not granting her
Criminal Rule 29 motion for acquittal. 14 2 As discussed previously, Ohio courts
have not clearly distinguished between these concepts.
There are three situations in which a reviewing court may be called upon to
review evidence. The first is in the setting of a Criminal Rule 29 motion for
1341d
135 Id
136 Id
137 Id
138 Id
139 id
1401id
141 Id
142id

at 503.
at 508.
at 509.

at 495.
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acquittal. A court can grant a motion for acquittal on its own motion or on the
motion of the defendant after the evidence of either side is closed. 143 A court can
reserve decision on a motion for acquittal until after the jury returns its verdict if
the motion is made at the close of all of the evidence. 44 A defendant can also raise
the issue on appeal. 45 Under a Criminal Rule 29 motion for acquittal, an issue is
for the jury if reasonable minds could disagree whether the defendant is guilty
when the evidence is "viewed in the light most favorable" to the prosecution. 146 A
47
reviewing court uses the same standard on appeal. 1
The other two situations involve claims that the verdict was against the
manifest weight of the evidence, or that the verdict was not supported by sufficient
evidence. 48 A manifest weight review is not equivalent to a sufficiency review. 149
In State v. Robinson, the Ohio Supreme Court stated:
Although there is sufficient evidence to sustain a verdict or finding of
guilty of second degree murder, a Court of Appeals has the power to
decide that such verdict or finding is against the weight of the
evidence. The Supreme Court is not required to and ordinarily does
not weigh the evidence. Therefore, it will not review the determination
by a Court of Appeals that a verdict or finding is against the weight of
the evidence. 150

Analytically, arguing that the verdict is against the manifest weight of the evidence
is equivalent to admitting that the prosecution's evidence was sufficient to support
the verdict.' 5 1 The concept of sufficiency is based on the United States
Constitution. 152 The concept of manifest weight is supported by the Ohio
Constitution. 153 A court of appeals can weigh evidence, but when reviewing a jury
verdict all three judges hearing the case must concur in order to reverse a
conviction. 154

143 OFHIO CRIM. R. 29(A).
144OHIO CRIM. R. 29(C).
145 See State v. Bdgeman, 381 N.E.2d 184 (Ohio 1978); Cincinnati v. Roben, 456 N.E.2d 1255 (Ohio Ct.

App. 1982).
14 6
Bridgeman, 381 N.E.2d at 185-86.
147 After determining the appropriate standard of review, the court determined whether it was properly
applied. Id at 186.

148 These two concepts will hereafter be referred to as manifest weight and sufficiency.
149 State v. Robinson, 124 N.E.2d 148, 149 (Ohio 1955)

1501d
151 Tibbs v. Florida, 457 U.S. 31, 42-43 (1982).
152 Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 322 (1979).
1530HIO CONST. art. IV, § 3(BX3) (amended 1968).
154/,d
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In Jenks, the court stated that the Kulig standard of review required a twostep analysis. '55 A reviewing Court was required to first determine whether the
evidence was sufficient to support the conviction. 156 In State v. Eley the court held
"[t]his court's examination of the record at trial is limited to a determination of
whether there was evidence presented, 'which, if believed, would convince the
average mind of the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt."' 15 7 In
performing this review, a court could focus primarily on the prosecution's evidence
because the issue was whether that evidence, if believed, was sufficient. Weighing
of the evidence was not involved. Eley is still good law and the standard for
reviewing sufficiency has not changed.
The second step was necessary because of Kulig. After reviewing whether
the prosecution's evidence was sufficient, a court was required to review the
circumstantial evidence. 158 The appropriate standard of review was whether the
defendant's evidence supported a reasonable theory of innocence. 159 This step
forced a reviewing court to examine the defendant's evidence. This examination
was required only when circumstantial evidence alone was relied on to prove an
essential element of the crime. 160 The second step necessarily involved weighing
the prosecution's theory of guilt against the defendant's theory of innocence. 161
In Kulig, the Court justified weighing the two theories by observing its
power to weigh evidence to a limited extent. 162 At that time, that proposition was
true. The Supreme Court of Ohio had addressed the weight of evidence on
occasion. 163 However, as stated in State v. Cooey, the court has no authority by the
Ohio Constitution to weigh evidence and now refuses to do so to any extent' 64
The Ohio Supreme Court has previously adopted the Jackson v. Virginia
standard when reviewing the sufficiency of evidence.165 This standard is consistent
with the previous Ohio standard as stated in Eley.166 However, in Jackson, the
United States Supreme Court rejected the idea that a prosecutor is required to
overcome "every hypothesis except that of guilt" under the federal definition of
reasonable doubt' a67
155 State v. Jenks, 574 N.E.2d 492, 497 (Ohio 1991).
156 id
157 State v. Eley, 383 N.E.2d 132, 134 (Ohio 1978).
158 Jenks, 574 N.E.2d at 497.
15 9
Kulig, 309 N.E.2d at 899.
160 Jenks, 574 NE.2d at 497.
161 Id
16 2
Kulig, 309 N.E.2d at 898.
163 See State v. Urbaytis, 102 N.E.2d 248 (Ohio 1951); Atkins v. State, 155 N.E. 189 (Ohio 1927).
164 544 N.E.2d 895,905-06 (Ohio 1989).
165 Stale v. Tyler, 553 N.E.2d 576, 588 (Ohio 1990).
166 State v. Eley, 383 N.E.2d 132, 134 (Ohio 1978).
167 Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 326 (1979).
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In York v. Tate, 168 a federal court held that Ohio's circumstantial evidence
standard of review is inconsistent with the Jackson standard. 169 The case involved
a federal district court decision granting a writ of habeas corpus. 70 The lower court71
had applied the Kulig standard when addressing the sufficiency of the evidence. 1
The lower court thought it was obliged to apply Kulig because an earlier decision
had held that the Jackson standard was to be applied in view of the state law
definitions of the substantive elements of the crime. 172 The federal court of appeals
held that the district court had misinterpreted the earlier decision. 173 More
importantly, the court held that the Kulig standard "is not required by the federal
Constitution and should not be applied by a federal court in deciding whether the
petitioner is entitled to habeas relief." 174
The court of appeals observed that the application of the Kulig standard
forced the district court to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the
defendant. 175 "By applying the Kulig rule, the district court turned the Jackson
standard on its head. Rather than asking whether any reasonable juror could have
found petitioner guilty, the district court considered whether any reasonable juror
could have found the petitioner not guilty."'1 76 The court acknowledged the district
court's finding that petitioner's theory of innocence was not "implausible" or
"irreconcilable" with the evidence, but still reversed the grant of the writ. 177
Jackson, Cooey, and York isolated the circumstantial evidence standard of
review. The Kulig standard of review became inconsistent with Ohio Supreme
Court and federal court holdings.
In Jenks, the court did not distinguish between weight and sufficiency. As
discussed previously, courts that have applied Kulig have not clearly distinguished
between the two concepts. When circumstantial evidence was a factor, Kulig
provided a standard by which a reviewing court could weigh the defendant's
evidence against the prosecution's evidence. 78 The sufficiency test required that the
evidence be viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution. 179 The
circumstantial evidence standard of review constituted a weight test and allowed a
168 858 F.2d 322 (6th Cir. 1988).
169 1& at 330.
170 U at 323.
171 Id.
1721d at327.
173 Ld.
at 327-29.
174 Id at 330.
17 5
Id
176 1,

177 Id. at 330. The court referred to the statements in Jackson that a prosecutor need not overcome "every
except that of guilt." Id
hypothesis
17 8
Jenks, 574 NE.2d at 497.

179 State v. Tyler, 553 N.E.2d 576, 588 (Ohio 1990).
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reviewing court to weigh the evidence on both sides. 180 The elimination of the
Kulig standard of review leaves the sufficiency test intact, but leaves some doubt as
to the appropriate standard of review when a defendant asserts that the verdict was
against the manifest weight of the evidence.
The Supreme Court of Ohio could eliminate any confusion by adopting
the views of the United States Supreme Court in Tibbs v. Florida.181 The holding
of the case involved an analysis of the difference between reversing a conviction as
against the manifest weight of the evidence and reversing based on insufficiency of
the evidence. 182 The part of the opinion concerning sufficiency is dicta but is
supported by authority in the decision and is quite pertinent. The United States
Supreme Court noted that a defendant who was acquitted because of a lack of
sufficient evidence could not be subjected to another trial. 1 83 On a finding of
insufficient evidence, a court holds that the prosecution's evidence was so lacking
that the state failed to meet its burden of proof. 18 Permitting additional trials would
allow the state to alter its strategy and perfect its evidence eventually resulting in a
conviction. 185 The Court stated this was a clear violation of the double jeopardy
clause of the United States Constitution. 186
On the other hand, a finding that the verdict is against the manifest weight
1 87
of the evidence does not preclude another trial.
A reversal based on the weight of the evidence, moreover, can occur
only after the State both has presented sufficient evidence to support
conviction and has persuaded the jury to convict. The reversal simply
affords the defendanta second opportunity to seek a favorable
judgment. 1'
The Court noted that the function of a reviewing court when reviewing the weight
of evidence is to act as a "thirteenth juror." 189 The Supreme Court of Florida held
that a court is allowed to address the credibility of witnesses and to weigh the
evidence. 19° In State v. Mattison an Ohio court of appeals directly confronted a

0
18 Jenks, 574 N.E.2d at 497.
181 457 U.S. 31 (1982).
182 ,dat 39-44.
183 Id. at 39 (dicta).

184 Id. at 37 (dicta).
185 Id. at 41 (dicta).
'86id at 39 (dicta).
187Id at 44.
188 Id at 42-43.
189 M at 42.
190 Id at 37.
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claim that the verdict was against the manifest weight of the evidence. 191 The court
stated several guidelines to be applied when weighing evidence:
1. Knowledge that even a reviewing Court of Appeals is not
required to accept as true the incredible. [Citations ommitted.]
2. Whether evidence is uncontradicted[.] [Citations ommitted.]
3. Whether a witness was impeached[.] [Citations ommitted.]
4. Consideration of what was not proved[.] [Citations ommitted.]
5. The certainty of the evidence[.] [Citations ommitted.]
6. The reliability of the evidence[.] [Citations ommitted.]
7. The extent to which any of the witnesses may have an interest to
advance or protect by their testimony[.] [Citations ommitted.]
8. The extent to which the evidence is vague, uncertain, conflicting,
fragmentary, or not fitting together in a [logical] pattern. [Citations
ommitted.] trThis approach would be compatible with Ohio law, the Ohio Constitution,
and the Constitution of the United States. Under the Ohio Constitution, a court of
appeals can weigh evidence. 193 In a jury trial, concurrence of all three judges is
required in order to reverse on the ground that the verdict is against the manifest
weight. 194 Under Cooey, the Supreme Court of Ohio could not review this
decision. 195 However, a reversal based on manifest weight would result only in
another trial, not an acquittal. 196 The guidelines of Mattison 197 could be used when
a reviewing court weighs evidence. The distinction between sufficiency and
manifest weight is supported in Ohio law by Robinson.19 Under the United States
Constitution, a trial court can acquit when evidence is not sufficient to be submitted
to the jury. 199 A reviewing court can acquit a defendant if it finds the trial court
191 490 N.E.2d 926,929 (Ohio CL App. 1985).
192 ! at 929-30.
19 3
OPEO CONST. art. IV, § 3(BX3) (amended 1968).
1941id
195 544 N.E.2d 895,905-06 (Ohio 1989).

196 See Tibbs v. Florida, 457 U.S. 31 (1982).
197 490 NE.2d 926,929-30 (Ohio 1985).
198 124 N.E.2d 148, 149 (Ohio 1955).

199 A conviction based on insufficient evidence violates the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 316-18 (1979). Evidence is sufficient only if each element
is proven beyond a reasonable doubt. d at 316 (citing In re Ninship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970)). After a finding
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should not have submitted the case to the jury under Criminal Rule 29 or under a
claim that the evidence was not sufficient to support the verdict. 2°°
The CircumstantialEvidence ChargeIntroduced a Higher Standardof Proof
In State v. Jenks, the court ultimately rested its decision to eliminate the
circumstantial evidence jury instruction on two premises. 20 ' First, circumstantial
evidence is just as probative as direct evidence, and there should be no distinction
in how the two are handled.202 Second, proof beyond a reasonable doubt is the only
standard required in a criminal case. 20 3 As previously discussed, the Supreme
Court of Ohio implied that the circumstantial evidence charge introduces a higher
standard of proof than is required by proof beyond a reasonable doubt. 204 The
court appears to have adopted the federal court view that the prosecution is not
required to rule out every reasonable hypothesis of innocence. 2°5 The history of the
circumstantial evidence rule shows its origins date back to a time when a
reasonable doubt existed "if the material facts without which guilt cannot be
established may be fairly reconciled with innocence." 2°6 It was eventually orphaned
by changes in the definition of reasonable doubt. The definition of reasonable
doubt commonly used one hundred years ago is incompatible with the definition
after State v. Jenks. By the current definition of reasonable doubt, the circumstantial
evidence charge introduces a higher standard of proof into a criminal trial.
CONCLUSION

The standard of appellate evidence review initiated by State v. Kulig
provided a way of weighing evidence when circumstantial evidence was relied
upon to prove an essential element of a crime. The process involved a two-step
analysis. In State v. Jenks the Supreme Court of Ohio expressed dissatisfaction

that evidence is insufficient, the Double Jeopardy Clause prevents another prosecution. Tibbs v. Florida,
457 U.S. 31, 42 (1982) (dicta).
200 Ohio appellate courts will review denial of a motion to acquit under Criminal Rule 29. See State v.
Bridgeman, 381 N.E.2d 184 (Ohio 1978); Cincinnati v. Robben, 456 N.E.2d 1255 (Ohio Ct. App. 1982). A
Criminal Rule 29 motion for acquittal is based on a claim that the evidence is insufficient to support a
conviction. CRIM R. 29(A). Ohio appellate courts will also entertain claims that evidence is insufficient to
support a conviction. See State v. Eley, 383 N.E.2d 132, 134 (Ohio 1978); State v. Tyler, 553 N.E.2d 576,
588-89 (Ohio 1990). A conviction based on insufficient evidence violates the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 316-18 (1979). After a finding that evidence is
insufficient, the Double Jeopardy Clause prevents another prosecution. Tibbs v. Florida, 457 U.S. 31, 42
(1982) (dicta).
201 Jenks, 574 N.E.2d at 502-03.

202Id at 502.
2031d at 503.
204 Id
205 Id. at 498.
206 Fuller v. State, 12 Ohio St. 433, 436 (Ohio 1861).
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with the two-step analysis and eliminated the circumstantial evidence standard of
review.2o7
Ohio courts have consistently confused reviewing evidence to determine
whether it is sufficient to support a verdict with reviewing whether a verdict is
against the manifest weight of the evidence. Ohio appellate courts have authority
by the Ohio Constitution to weigh evidence. 208 The holding of Jenks eliminated
one of the tools that Ohio appellate courts used to weigh evidence. This holding
may add to the confusion.
A possible solution lies in adopting the federal definitions and associated
standards of review for determining whether evidence is sufficient to support a
verdict and whether a verdict is against the manifest weight of the evidence.
Adopting these definitions would be one more step in what appears to be a trend to
conform with federal criminal law.
The origin and history of the circumstantial evidence charge was explored
and compared to the history of the definition of reasonable doubt in Ohio. The
analysis showed that the circumstantial evidence charge and the definition of
reasonable doubt were once compatible. The definition of reasonable doubt
changed over a period of 130 years and the circumstantial evidence jury charge
became alienated. Under the current definition of reasonable doubt, the
circumstantial evidence jury charge introduces a higher standard of proof.

K EviN L. L EFFEL*

207.enks, 574 N.E.2d at 502-03.
208 OHIO CONST. art. IV, § 3(B)(3) (amended 1968).
* I would like to acknowledge Associate Professor J. Dean Carro for providing guidance and inspiration
during the preparation of this casenote. Any errors, of course, are my own.
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